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Moral Rights and The Internet:  Squaring the Circle
Lionel de Souza and Charlotte Waelde
Introduction 
The Internet, it is said, makes territorial borders redundant1.  Information in digitised form of 
pictures, text, music, photographs can all be seamlessly disseminated from one side of the globe 
to the other.  There is (almost) nothing to stop these works from being uploaded, made 
available, communicated, distributed and finally downloaded anywhere in the world.  Despite the 
emergence of decisions intended to give a more territorial character to the contents posted on 
the Internet2, borders, whether physical or psychological, do not (at present) seem to exist for 
the users. The effect of this absence of borders is that in many areas of law acute questions arise 
over matters of jurisdiction and, notably, choice of law.  In the event of a dispute concerning 
artefacts made available on a website considered illegal in one country but not in another, exactly 
which courts should have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, and whose law should be applied to 
determine the illegality3?  Where a programmer on one side of the world writes a program that 
contravenes the laws applicable within the borders of a territory on the other side of the world, 
which law should determine the liability of that programmer4?  When one electronic newspaper 
publishes an article potentially defamatory of an individual on the other side of the world, which 
courts should hear the disputes and which standards should determine the liability of the 
newspaper5?
These are just some of the extraordinarily thorny issues to have been considered by courts 
around the world in recent months.  Given the uncertainty, some attempt has been made to 
harmonise rules on jurisdiction.  Within the EU, the Brussels Regulation6 (which came into force 
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and replaced the Brussels Convention in March 20027) seeks to revise certain jurisdiction rules 
applicable to exploitation over the Internet, the purpose being also to streamline enforcement of 
judgements.  That this area is fraught with political difficulty can be seen by the failure to reach 
agreement at the Hague Conference on International Private Law where delegates sought to find 
a similar solution but on an International basis8.  As regards choice of law, within the EU it has 
recently been announced that the Rome Convention9 will be revamped and extended, and in 
particular the question of non-contractual liability will also be addressed.  Once again the 
intention is to bring the law into line with the reality of dissemination and exploitation using a 
medium without apparent borders.  It is not the purpose of this article to revisit these difficult 
issues.  Rather it is to examine one particular area - that of moral rights - and to discuss how 
these cross border conflicts might impact on the existence and exercise of these rights.  
What are moral rights?
Moral rights can be described as attributes of copyright directly attached to the person of the 
author. The purpose of moral rights is to grant the author the respect he deserves for the 
personal investment made in the process of creation and therefore exist regardless  of any 
financial or patrimonial consideration. Moral rights are most closely linked with those territories 
which adhere to the Civilian or “droit d’auteur” system of protection for creative works.  By 
contrast, those who follow the common law or Anglo-American approach place the economic 
interests bestowed by copyright as the matter of fundamental importance.  In these countries 
moral rights, if present in domestic legislation, tend to be weak rights introduced in response to 
international obligations.  The major difference in emphasis between the two streams has been 
expressed by opposing “'common law copyright’, with its emphasis on protection of economic rights, 
and 'civil law authors’ rights’, which puts the author in the first place”10. 
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The major moral rights, to be found in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works 1886 and which are the minimum standards which should be incorporated into 
the domestic laws of those counties who are signatories to that Convention are found in Article 
6bis.  That article provides that ‘independently of the author’s economic rights and even after the transfer of 
the rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to …the work which would be prejudicial 
to his honour or reputation’.  The rights are to last at least until the expiry of the economic rights 
with a concession for countries whose legislation at the time of accession to the Convention 
does not provide for the protection after death of the author to provide that some of the rights 
may cease to be maintained after death.
Shaping copyright for the digital era
The law of copyright in general has undergone dramatic transformation over the last five years.  
Largely in response to the fears of those at the helm of the music industry, that of seeing their
content being washed away through the electronic sieve11, measures to shape copyright at the 
international, regional and domestic level have been hammered out.  One of the earliest 
International Treaties to address the digital age, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), set the 
scene for copyright and the digital agenda as early as 1996.  The US implementation of the 
obligations imposed under this Treaty followed in the form of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act 1998 (DMCA).  Europe has recently enacted the European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society (the Infosoc Directive)12 due to be implemented in the 15 Member States by 
22 December 2002.  
Three main strands or planks are discernible from this programme.  The first is the move to 
introduce or clarify  rights concerning digital dissemination of works where it was felt that 
existing rights did not adequately protect copyright owners or did not do so with sufficient 
precision.  Thus in the WCT13 and in the Infosoc Directive14 rights concerning communication 
to the public and making available to the public of works on the Internet have been addressed.  
Second, within Europe at least, there is an attempt to harmonise the exceptions and limitations 
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to copyright laws throughout the Member States.  The Infosoc  Directive contains an exhaustive 
list of these elements in the text, the majority of which the Member States have the option of 
incorporating into domestic law15. Finally there has been a move to validate the technical 
protection measures rights holders use in conjunction with the dissemination of their works over 
the internet, such as anti-copying devices,  and in tandem, the outlawing of the circumvention of 
these devices16.  
Moral rights in the digital area?
However, in all this flurry, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of moral 
rights17.  The WCT merely requires signatory states to abide by Articles 2-6 of the Berne 
Convention but says nothing new about moral rights.  Certainly, the Treaty negotiated at the 
same time as the WCT, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) requires the 
introduction (where not already enacted) of moral rights for performers concerning their live 
aural performances and those fixed in phonograms18.  But that is as far as it goes.  Moral rights 
are absent from the DMCA 1998.  The Infosoc Directive makes no mention of moral rights 
either, preferring rather to leave consideration of these to individual member states19 apparently 
on the basis that moral rights will not distort the functioning of the internal market:  but is this 
really the case?  Certainly, further attempts to deal with moral rights of audio-visual performers 
at international level have been beset with problems.  At the time of finalisation of the WCT and 
WPPT in 1996, attempts were made to negotiate a Treaty covering audio-visual performers’ 
rights both economic and moral.  Consensus was not obtained at this time, but there was a 
commitment to return to the negotiating table at a later date.  In December 2000 negotiations 
resumed.  Once again, the question of moral rights for audio-visual performers proved 
problematic. At issue was the extent to which the right of integrity could be limited due to the 
need to edit films for public consumption20.  Finally, the main committee adopted by consensus 
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Article 5 which would have granted performers the right of integrity and the right to be 
identified as the performer21.  However, this was to be supplemented by an agreed statement, the 
purpose of which was to allow changes to be made for purposes ‘such as editing, compression, 
dubbing or formatting’,  the effect of which would be to substantially water down the right of 
integrity22.   Given that the negotiations finally broke up with no agreement having been attained 
on other Articles in the Treaty, whether the Article on moral rights survives in this form remains 
to be seen23.  This lengthy, and fraught battle serves to highlight how entrenched the opposed 
positions are.
Why are moral rights considered problematic?
Why are some countries, notably those who follow the Anglo-American tradition wary of 
introducing a fully fledged moral rights regime?  There may be a number of reasons for this, 
primarily rooted in economic argument.  Firstly, it may be because of the potential impact the 
exercise of moral rights  may have on economic exploitation of creative works.  At their most 
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21 Article 5 of the draft treaty stated: Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of those rights, the 
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22 The full agreed statement concerning Article 5 stated: For the purposes of this Treaty and without prejudice to any other 
treaty, it is understood that, considering the nature of audiovisual fixations and their production and distribution, modifications of a 
performance that are made in the normal course of exploitation of the performance, such as editing, compression, dubbing or formatting, in 
existing or new media or formats, and that are made in the course of a use authorised by the performer, would not in themselves amount 
to modification within the meaning of Article 5(1)(ii).  Rights under Article 5(1)(ii) are concerned only with changes that are objectively 
prejudicial to the performer’s reputation in a substantial way.  It is also understood that the mere use of new or changed technology or 
media, as such, does not amount to modification within the meaning of Article 5(1)(ii).  The tensions and worries evident in this 
statement were anticipated by Cornish.  ‘Those who organise complex audio or audiovisual productions resist the claims of all 
creative or interpretative contributors to be treated with the scrupulous concern appropriate to the sole genius.  They do so now as never 
before, because the media, computer and telecommunications industries are together in the process of opening the Pandora’s box of 
digitisation with its prospect of multi-media products which derive their content from a host of inputs, many of them existing copyright 
works.  Great corporations, smart-card businesses and cottage whiz-kids are all going to want simple access to the pool of existing 
material and dread the prospect of copyright laws which allow self important, super-sensitive or (let’s face it) silver-lining souls to flaunt 
their exclusive rights in ways that may put paid to new and exciting technologies’.   Cornish Authors in Law 1995, MLR Vol 58, 1 
at p2.
23 The second, and crucial problem faced at the negotiations stemmed from the ownership of the exclusive 
economic rights (those of broadcasting and communication to the public, fixation, reproduction, distribution).  
Articles 6-11.  The US delegation favoured the inclusion of a provision which would have automatically transferred 
performers economic rights to the producer thereby facilitating the exploitation of the film.  In addition, in a move 
that is unusual for treaties dealing with intellectual property, a proposed clause would have in effect designated the 
law to be applied to determine the transfer of those rights.  One option under consideration would have designated 
that law as that of the country most closely connected with the particular audiovisual fixation.  The first choice in 
designating that country would have been that of the contracting party in which the producer of the fixation has his 
headquarters or habitual residence.  The effect would have been to allow a country to ‘export’ its domestic law.  Of 
particular concern was the effect that the US work for hire doctrine would have on the ownership and exploitation 
of films in foreign countries.  For a detailed discussion see von Lewinski The WIPO Diplomatic Conference On 
Audiovisual Performances: A First Resume 2001, E.I.P.R. 23(7), 333-343.
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extreme, moral rights allow an author a perpetual right to exert some control over the use of a 
work, and how the work may and may not be exploited in the marketplace24.  The exercise of 
moral rights thus impedes the finality of contracts, and inhibits the freedom of the holders of the 
economic rights to deal with the tangible object embodying the work.  In essence, they detract 
from the ability of those who wish to transform the author’s work into another medium, to do 
so without interference25.  They are thus inconsistent with the absolute nature of property, and 
with its alienation26.  
Second, the reluctance is also likely to stem from the differing historical traditions.  Moral rights 
and their association with the author stemming from theories of natural rights,  have not been a 
part of the historical development of copyright in the Anglo-American traditions.  Indeed, in 
1996 it was said by a US commentator that: 
‘It may be a good idea to try to incorporate some droit d’auteur concepts in US copyright law.  However, this may 
be a difficult, if not impossible exercise.  In any case, the US and Europe need a common standard for treating 
commercially exploitable works on the Internet.  If Europe wants to be on the same level as the US, it will 
probably have to be without the author’s rights paradigms.  The US most likely will not accept them27’.
Leading on from there may be the perception that moral rights are largely associated with ideal 
of ‘romantic authorship’:  the view that works protected by copyright are produced by those tucked 
away in their lonely garrets, labouring long and hard over a creative work.  The reality for many, 
from the earliest times, appears to have been different. Creativity has always been associated with 
wealth and the desire of the wealthy to own creative objects, followed by the economic 
advantages that could be gained from exploiting works for the masses28.  Copyright has, 
                                                
24 Hansmann and Santilli Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights:  A Comparative legal and Economic Analysis 1997, 26 J Legal 
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US industries and US industry oriented policy which tend to favour the interests of producers in commercialising the protected work with 
as few restrictions as possible from residual rights vested in authors’.  Drier Copyright issues in a Digital Publishing World  
http://associnst.ox.ac.uk/~icsuinfo/dreier.htm.  This idea of the performer having the ability to determine or 
control or even an influence over the way in which audio-visual productions are dealt with once filmed appears to 
be at the heart of what has driven the desire to see the inclusion of the agreed statement concerning Article 5 of the 
audio-visual performers treaty.
25 Some argue that establishing a ‘moral right imposes a real economic and political cost on society’.  Those who want to use 
works need to deal with two owners:  the moral and economic.  Each new use is ‘at the mercy of the author’.  Lemley 
The Economics of Improvement 1997, Texas Law Review Vol 75:989 p1032.  Lemley also argues that no parodies or 
satires would be permitted.  But cf French Intellectual Property Code L122-5.
26 In the UK, it has been argued that because every infraction of a moral right impairs another person’s freedom to 
do business, enforcement should be confined to cases of real injury Cornish Intellectual Property 11-89.
27 Lehman in colloquium discussions in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment  Hugenholtz (ed) Kluwer 1996 
p 239.
28In Worldly Goods. A New History of the Renaissance MacMillan 1996, the author, Professor Jardine, argues that from 
the mid fifteenth century important artists were to be found wherever a major trading centre was located: ‘and there 
7
however, always needed some association with the author because of the desire to justify such 
elements of the right as the term of protection, and the requirement of some creative spark, both 
intimately linked to authorial contribution.  
A third reason may lie behind the reluctance of those within the Anglo-American systems to 
embrace moral rights, and that may stem from the very low level of originality required from an 
author before a work produced by her can qualify for copyright protection, summed up in the 
phrase: ‘What is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting’29.  It is perhaps notable that when 
copyright can protect something as mundane as football pools coupons and telephone 
directories, many are likely to balk at the idea of giving rights to the individual author to object to 
derogatory treatment, or to insist on being credited as author of that type of work.
Suffice it to say that it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that agreement will be attained at 
international level in relation to moral rights. But these tensions between the two systems may 
become more rather than less pronounced as trade in creative works over the Internet increases.  
Moral rights and the information era
What effect might the failure to deal with moral rights for the digital era have on exploitation of 
creative works made available over the Internet?  One writer has suggested that it could mean 
that the laws of those territories who have the most protective moral rights regime could be 
applied to any work made available over the Internet30 where the work is accessible in that 
territory.  Thus the standards set by the most protective regime could be applied to the 
exploitation of all creative works whether or not the domestic law of the author would provide 
such rights. 
The notion of territoriality in the law of copyright
The law of copyright has its own territorial rules an understanding of which is essential to be able 
to appreciate the difficulties that become apparent in relation to the cross-border availability of 
                                                                                                                                                       
are therefore wealthy entrepreneurs to purchase’ p123.  She goes on to say that: ‘The period of transition from manuscript to print, 
the relationships between authors, manufacturers, buyers and backers were shaped by…opportunities which characterise any innovation in 
the commercial sphere. The prospect of producing an individual work in print …was above all a business opportunity, suggested by a ‘gap 
in the market’ or by a recognised local demand for printed material of a particular kind’.  P142.
29 University of London Press, Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press, Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. at p. 610. Peterson.J.
30 Gigante Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway:  Foreign Liability for Domestically Created Content 1996, 14 Cardozo 
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works protected by copyright.  The heart of the system is well illustrated by the following 
quotation:
“There is no international copyright law as such, but rather a collection of national copyright laws, bound by the 
Berne Convention into a multilateral non discrimination (national treatment) accord”31. 
The notion of territoriality within the law of copyright is considered as being ‘capable of many 
different definitions ’32. It is, however, the cornerstone of the oldest International Treaty concerned 
with the protection of copyright and related rights, the Berne Convention33. That the interests of 
authors and owners of copyright deserved to be protected in a world where tangible works 
protected by copyright could be traded both at home and abroad was uppermost in the minds of 
the drafters of the original Berne Convention.  However, that desire was tempered by the 
practicalities of the need to find some common ground amongst interested parties whose 
substantive copyright laws diverged in many respects.  In 1886 this led those same drafters to 
create minimum standards of protection in the Treaty: ‘a floor, but member countries may vary the 
height of the ceiling’34. 
The ceiling is an essential element in considering the notion of territoriality. It is deeply linked 
with the idea that each country disposes of its own set of rules relating to copyright laws, at least 
affording minimum standards of protection. Copyright rules thus recognise a set of rights for an 
owner or author within the borders of one state. The result is that the laws applicable in one 
territory will not be applied to infringements that occur abroad.  
The limited scope of each of the copyright systems had to be compensated by a mutual 
recognition of the rights of the authors. This was achieved through the adoption of what is 
known as the ‘national treatment principle’ and which is the most striking evidence of the 
implications of the territoriality principle. By the operation of this rule, the nationals of the 
signatories of the Berne Convention are granted in a foreign country the benefit of the same 
rights as those granted to the nationals of that country. This is expressed in article 5(2): ‘the extent 
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed’. There has been some discussion over the 
                                                
31 Ginsburg, Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through 
Digital Networks, Geneva  December 16 to 18, 1998, (hereafter Ginsburg 1998) 
http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/1998/gcpic/doc/gcpic_2.doc, 
32 ibid. 
33 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 
34 Ginsburg 1998.
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years as to the meaning to be attributed to the phrase ‘the country where protection is claimed’.  Some 
have argued that it should be interpreted as the law of the forum, as that is where the claimant 
seeks protection.  Others argue that it is rather to be interpreted as the country ‘for which’ 
protection is claimed against infringing acts occurring there.  Most commentators now agree that 
the second interpretation is the one to be preferred35, and indeed, it is the interpretation that is 
consistent with the accepted notion that there is no such thing as international copyright law, but 
rather a collection of national laws36. 
Territoriality thus gave valuable protection to authors who sought to expand their markets for 
their works beyond their home shores.  It was the means by which these markets could be 
exploited whilst at the same time according protection to the authors, and control over the fruit 
of their labours.  And so it worked, and appeared to work well:  until the inexorable rise of the 
Internet and information technologies.  National treatment, once lauded as providing the basis 
for protection for those who wanted to venture into foreign territories has suddenly become a 
complex maze seemingly set to trap copyright owners in pursuit of those who infringe their 
copyright around the globe.
The first problem for copyright owners stems from the mobility of the Internet. Mobility in this 
context means that Internet sites are of such a nature that it is relatively easy to relocate them 
within a very short timescale, sometimes within only a matter of hours.  This relocation can be 
within a particular territory, or notably between different territories.  This fluidity has raised 
serious debate in International Private law. Questions revolve around the appropriate means of 
determination of the forum as well as the law to be applied to any infringement37. 
                                                
35 ibid p35.
36 However, it should be noted that this idea of territoriality does not prevent the courts of a country from applying 
laws that are not their own. Thus jurisdiction may be seized in the courts of one country, perhaps on the grounds of 
domicile of the defendant (Brussels Convention Article 2) or of one of many defendants (Brussels Convention 
Article 6(1)).  Nevertheless, if the alleged infringement of copyright takes place abroad, then the laws of the place 
where the reproduction took place will be applied to determine the extent of the infringement.  See the UK case
Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership [1999] FSR 525 where jurisdiction was accepted in the English courts on the basis of 
Article 6(1) Brussels Convention (multiple defendants) but as the alleged infringement took place in Denmark (the 
copying of architects plans by constructing a building to the design) Dutch law is to be applied to determine the 
extent of that infringement.
37 See Ginsburg 1998, above and in addition the papers on Private International Law and Intellectual Property to be 
found on the WIPO website.  There were two conferences, the first in 1998, and the second in 2001, both of which 
resulted in a number of articles.  Particularly useful references are as follows: Lucas Private international law aspects of the 
protection of works and objects of related rights transmitted through digital networks.  Paper GCPIC/1. Lucas, Private international 
law aspects of the protection of works and of the subject matter of related rights transmitted over digital networks  Paper 
WIPO/PIL/01/1.  Ginsburg, Private international law aspects of the protection of works and objects of related rights transmitted 
through digital networks Paper GCPIC/2. (Cited in this article).  Ginsburg, Private international law aspects of the protection of 
works and objects of related rights transmitted through digital networks (2000 update) Paper WIPO/PIL/01/2.  Austin, Private 
international law and intellectual property rights A common law overview Paper WIPO/PIL/01/5.  See also Torremans, Private 
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The second essential feature inherent in the Internet, and one that is more deeply linked with this 
analysis is the fact that the Internet permits a wide dissemination of information and thus of 
copyright works. This also provokes an important question as to the relevance of territoriality. 
As Ginsburg has said, ‘now that digital media make possible the instantaneous, world-wide communication of 
works of authorship, the territorially discrete approach to international copyright has come under considerable 
strain’38.
The Internet has thus put the practice of national treatment, not to mention the theory that 
sustains it, in a predicament.  The distribution of an infringing copy of a work immediately 
becomes international on the Internet, and the harm is thus felt in several fora by the author and 
copyright owner. This provokes clashes between the different systems. The content if not the 
nature of moral rights differ as between various countries and as territoriality imposes the 
application of the law of the country where protection is claimed, the benefits of protection vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, it might be possible for authors to choose the law 
and thus the most advantageous provisions to be applied to their case.
In this perspective, the disparities in the content and the nature of moral rights in France and the 
United Kingdom give a perfect field of analysis. In particular, the French case law has reached a 
point which might suggest an expansion of the scope of territoriality. This analysis will be 
combined with the findings of the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) in the case of Shevill. 
This latter point will be considered first as it is the one that would permit ‘forum shopping’ by 
the author. 
The ECJ in “Shevill” : A Basis for Forum Shopping?
The question at the basis of Shevill v. Press Alliance39 was one of competence of courts in a cross-
border wrongdoing.  Shevill concerned defamation but non-the-less is instructive for this 
discussion for two reasons:  firstly, it concerns different jurisdictions, namely France and 
England.  Secondly, interesting comments are made in  the case relating to the place of harm for 
cross-border delict cases. 
                                                                                                                                                       
International Law Aspects of IP – Internet Disputes, in Edwards and Waelde, Law and the Internet – A Framework for 
Electronic Commerce, 2nd edition, 2000. 
38 Ginsburg 1998. 
39 Shevill and Others v. Press Alliance, case C-68/93 [1995] 2 WLR 499. 
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The facts were as follows:  In 1989 an issue of the newspaper 'France Soir' published by a French 
company contained an article with comments about an individual resident in England, a 
company registered in Yorkshire, a company registered in France and a company registered in 
Belgium.  The article contained defamatory material. An action was raised in England for 
damages in respect of copies of the newspaper distributed in England and Wales.  An application 
was sought to have the case struck out on the grounds that the French courts alone had 
jurisdiction as the newspaper was domiciled in France.  It was argued that Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention40 was irrelevant because as the matter related to tort, delict or quasi delict, 
the English courts did not have jurisdiction;  that section related to ‘the place where the harmful 
event occurred’;  the harmful event in this case (being the publication of the newspaper), it was 
argued,  had occurred in France.
The ECJ was asked for a preliminary ruling on two broad issues.  The first was for guidance on 
the interpretation of the phrase ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’ to establish which 
court had jurisdiction where a defamatory statement was distributed in several States. 
The solution given by the ECJ followed the principle laid down in the 1976 case of 
Handelskwekerij G J Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA41. The Court considered that action 
could be brought ‘against the publisher either before the courts of the contracting state where the publisher of the 
defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by the 
defamation, or before the courts of each contracting state in which the publication was distributed and where the 
victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm 
caused in the state of the court seised’. 
This case concerned defamation.  What might its application be in the field of copyright and, 
more specifically, moral rights?
The Brussels Convention certainly applies to intellectual property42. Intellectual property is a 
‘civil and commercial’ matter to which the Convention is directed.  Copyright infringement is 
thus included in the scope of the Convention43. Article 16(4) which gives exclusive jurisdiction to 
the courts of the State in which the intellectual property right is registered is not applicable to 
                                                
40 This Article states: ‘In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred’.
41 Handelskwekerij G J Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA, case C-21/76 [1976] E.C.R. 1735.
42 See eg. Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd and Others [1997] 3 All ER 31.  For an in depth analysis of the interaction 
between private international law and intellectual property see Fawcett and Torremans Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law Claredon Press Oxford 1998.
43 See Lloyd J in Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd and Others [1997] 3 All ER 31
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copyright actions because ‘copyright does not require any registration or any deposit for its creation’44. 
Rather, the actions for infringement are to be dealt with in application of article 5(3) as they are 
intended to repair a tortuous action45.  Thus the solution adopted in the Shevill case could find an 
application in the field of copyright.
Thus, where an infringing copy of a work protected by copyright is disseminated without 
authorisation over the Internet, Shevill would suggest that any court in the European Union could 
hear a case concerning that infringement46.  Where the owner chooses to litigate in the courts of 
the place where the harm arose (perhaps where the original uploading took place, or where the 
work is stored on a server) then the courts of that country should be able to hear an action for all 
the harm that subsequently occurs.  Where the owner chooses to litigate in a particular state 
where the harm is felt, the courts would only consider the extent of the harm within that 
particular state.  
Critically for this study, the second part of the decision in Shevill made some important points as 
regards the law to be applied to the conflict.  The Shevill court ruled that “the criteria for assessing 
whether the event in question is harmful and the evidence required of the existence and extent of the harm 
alleged… are not governed by the Convention but by the substantive law determined by the national conflict of law 
rules of the court seised”47.
This rule was laid down in the context of defamation:  its application in the field of copyright 
seems likely to have much more dramatic effects. In this respect, two points deserve 
consideration.  First, the rule laid down by the ECJ has to be considered in connection with the 
content of the rights afforded to authors. Moral rights differ in important substantive respects as 
between the UK and France.  Defamation laws differ also, but it may be that these differences 
do not have the same impact on those affected.  In Shevill the true reason behind the attempt by 
the plaintiff to sue before the English courts was that the law applied by them was: ‘more 
sympathetic towards plaintiffs than French law. The plaintiff did not need to  prove actual damage and the good 
faith of the publisher was generally irrelevant’48. 
                                                
44 Torremans, Private International Law Aspects of IP – Internet Disputes, in Edwards and Waelde, Law and the Internet –
A Framework For Electronic Commerce, second edition, 2000, p. 227.
45 See Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd and Others v. Akzo Nobel NV and Another [1998] FSR 222.
46 The Brussels Convention will apply wherever the defendant is domiciled in a contracting state.  The location of 
the claimant is irrelevant. 
47 Shevill and Others v. Press Alliance, case C-68/93 [1995] 2 WLR 499.
48 Forsyth, Defamation Under the Brussels Convention : A Forum Shopper’s Charter? [1995] CLJ 515.
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The idea behind the eventual choice of a French court in the case of an alleged infringement of 
the moral rights of the author seems, at first sight, in the same line. However, it seems that such 
a case would take a step further. Indeed, in Shevill the differences that were circumvented by the 
choice of the English court concerned the ‘evidence required of the existence and the extent of the harm 
alleged’. This does not provoke a real clash between the two systems since both recognise the 
existence of the right to sue for defamation with more or less stringent conditions for 
indemnification. On the other side, moral rights do not seem to fit the same criteria.  The 
circumstances of their existence generally differ49, sometimes to the point that some are likely to 
be considered as non-existent  in UK law. Further, the grounds on which they are infringed 
differ substantially.  This raises the situation where the choice of a forum by the author who sees 
his work put on the Internet without consent, and perhaps to the detriment of the work in 
question, will lead to a more pronounced avoidance of the rules of his home state than in 
defamation cases. 
Moral rights in France and the UK
Comparing moral rights as between the UK and France reveals some of these deep seated 
differences. Moral rights did not appear in UK legislation before the adoption of the Copyright 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988)50 but, at common law, Courts used the general laws 
of defamation51, passing off52 or injurious falsehood to find some, albeit limited, redress for 
litigants.  The appearance of moral rights in the CDPA 1988 only occurred as a result of the 
ratification by the United Kingdom of the provisions of Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention 
adopted in 192853 but made compulsory in 194854.  As a consequence four moral rights were 
introduced in the 1988 Act55.  These are the right to be identified as author56 which requires to be 
asserted before it can be infringed57 (the right of paternity), the right to object to derogatory 
treatment of a work58 (the right of integrity), the right against false attribution of a work,59 and 
the right to privacy in private photographs and films60.  All these rights are inalienable61 and 
                                                
49 See the case of the right of integrity infra, where in the UK it is only considered as infringed if the derogatory 
treatment is likely to affect the author’s honour or reputation while French law admits it much more easily.
50 The right of integrity came into force on 1 August 1989. 
51 Humphreys v Thompson [1905-1910] Mac CC 148.
52 Samuelson v Producers Distributing  [1932] 1 Ch 201.
53 Berne Convention, Rome version (1928).
54 Berne Convention, Brussels version (1948). 
55 CDPA 1988 ss 77-89.
56 CDPA 1988 s77.
57 CDPA 1988 s 78.
58 CDPA  1988 s80.
59 CDPA  1988 s84.
60 CDPA  1988 s85.
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transmissible on death62.   However, they may be waived at any time by agreement63.  Subsequent 
case law has been patchy at best, but what there has been suggests in particular that the courts 
will use an objective rather than subjective test to determine derogatory treatment (possibly the 
most problematic moral right for exploiters), leaving an author at the mercy of third parties64.  
French law and jurisprudence, on the other hand, places great importance on moral rights.  
Developed during the course of the nineteenth century through case law, they were codified in 
the 1957 Act65. French law now recognises the right of integrity or the “droit au respect de 
l’œuvre”66, the right to release, or to refuse to release a work, known as the “droit de 
divulgation”67,  the right to withdraw or modify the work, known as the “droit de retrait ou de 
repentir”68,  the right to be recognised as the author of the work or to remain anonymous, the 
right not to have a work attributed to another,  and a right not to have a name associated with a 
work by another (“droit de paternité”)69. The extensive nature of moral rights under French law, 
evidencing the primary importance of the author in the system has  been expressed through case 
law. The courts have, it could be argued, been rivalling each other in the use of terminology  to 
underline this character. It has  been said that “the moral right (…), aimed at protecting what is most 
precious to the author, that is the respect of his personality, is, by its very nature, unlimited in time and non 
transferable”70. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the Courts in France consider that “the 
exercise of the moral right by the author of an original work bears a discretionary character and therefore the 
appreciation of the legitimacy of this exercise exceeds the competence of the judge”71. 
From the brief discussion above, the differences between the two systems are obvious.  
However, a case of particular relevance to this investigation, Huston v Turner Entertainment Co72, 
took a step further. An analysis of this case drives home the potential of the Internet and its 
                                                                                                                                                       
61 CDPA  1988 s94.
62 CDPA 1988 s95.
63 CDPA 1988 s87.
64 Tidy v The Trustees of the Natural History Museum (1995) 37 IPR 501, Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v Lightbody Ltd [1993] 
EMLR 144, Patersfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168, Alan Clark v Associated Newspapers [1998] 1 WLR 1558; [1998] 1 All 
ER 959; [1998] RPC 261.  See also Vaver Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow IJLIT Vol 7 No 3 2000 at 270.  
65 On this, see Davies, The Convergence of Copyright and Authors’ Rights – Reality or Chimera ?, (1995) 26 IIC 964.
66 French Intellectual Property Code Title 11 Article 121-1.
67 French Intellectual Property Code Article L 121-2.
68 French Intellectual Property Code Article L 121-4.
69 French Intellectual Property Code Article L 121-1.
70 See T. civ. Seine, 6 and 7 April 1949, Pierre Blanchar et autres v. Sté Ets Gaumont, JCP 1950, II, 5462 : “Le droit moral 
(…) destiné à assurer à l’auteur ce qu’il a de plus précieux, le respect de sa personnalité, est, par par son essence même perpétuel et 
incessible”. 
71 Cass. Civ. 1e, 5 June 1984, RIDA, April 1985, p. 150 : “L’exercice du droit moral par l’auteur de l’œuvre originale revêt un 
caractère discrétionnaire, de sorte que l’appréciation de la légitimité de cet exercice échappe au juge”. 
72 Cass. Civ. 1e, 28 May 1991 ; Consorts Huston et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. ; Syndicat Français des Artistes 
Interprètes et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. et autres, JCP (1991), II, 21731.
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disregard of territorial borders and thus the principles on which the International Treaties are 
based.
The Huston decision73
The problem in this case revolved around the intended broadcast by a French television channel 
of an audio-visual work: a feature film by John Huston entitled ‘Asphalt Jungle. The estate of the 
deceased director went before the French judge to try and prevent the broadcast of this film. 
The arguments put forward to support the claim concerned the moral rights of the director. The 
version that was to be aired was a coloured one, whereas the original version was in black and 
white. That the movie was not in colour was a deliberate choice made by John Huston, since he 
had the technical means to film in colour. Moreover, he always had expressed his opposition to 
any possibility of colourising his film. After his death, a coloured version was however made by 
Turner Entertainment Co. which had acquired the MGM catalogue in 1986 and thus became the 
holder of the copyright to the movie. 
Two questions were at stake. The first, which is not central to the instant discussion, raised the 
issue of whether colouring a movie affected the moral rights of the creator (there is no doubt 
that it was an infringing act if it affected the integrity of the creation).  In CDPA 1988 
vocabulary, was it derogatory treatment?  In line with its earlier jurisprudence74, the French court 
decided that adding colours to a film originally in black and white was a violation of the right of 
integrity of the author (the “droit au respect”)75.
The second and most interesting question for this analysis dealt with the possibility of a foreign 
author invoking moral rights conferred by French law even if his country of origin (home state) 
did not afford authors any such right. The question under US law (home to Turner 
Entertainment Co.) was of particular relevance since the country had not ratified the Berne
Convention at that time, but did so during the course of the action. 
In considering the issue of recourse to French moral rights by the estate of a foreign author to 
prevent the public disclosure (in this case broadcasting) of an allegedly derogatory treatment of 
the audio-visual work, the French courts had to deal with some factual oddities under the French 
                                                
73   ibid. 
74 For the addition of colours to an originally black and white photograph, see Cass. Crim., 3 March 1898, Ann. 
Propr. Ind. 1899. 72
75 See on similar facts : TGI Versailles (Chambres Réunies), 19 December 1994, RIDA, April 1995, p. 389.
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droit d’auteur texts. Indeed, Turner Entertainment Co. invoked its position as the author of the 
movie under US law. By stark contrast, French law does not allow for a non-physical person to 
be considered as the author of a protected work. Thus the first conflict arose between French and 
American law was as to the position of the author. The essential point of the debate revolved 
around this: if John Huston was not to be considered as the author of the film, he could not 
invoke the benefit of the moral rights since they are attached (under French law) to his sole 
person. A second conflict arose between the two systems at stake:  could the moral rights 
granted by French law enable authors to circumvent in part the effect of an assignation which 
was valid in the country of origin?
In its decision, the Paris Appeals Court76 considered that the answers to these questions should 
be given in favour of Turner Entertainment Co. As it was not in effect at the time of the 
assignation, the court refused to take into account the ratification by the US of the Berne 
Convention.  As discussed above, the Convention text provides that ‘the extent of protection, as well 
as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
country where protection is claimed’.77 More specifically that ‘ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work 
shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed’78.  The only international 
instrument that could thus be referred to was thus the Universal Copyright Convention which 
did not deal with the definition of the author. The court then held that the law to be applied was 
that of the country of the work, ie. US law.
In considering this case the Paris Appeals Court faced a situation similar to that which was raised 
in the earlier case of Rowe79. In that case, Rowe had claimed for infringement of his moral rights
(integrity and paternity) after Walt Disney Productions had produced and exploited an animation 
film entitled “The Aristocats”.  This was based on an original idea of Rowe’s, who had assigned 
his rights to the work (initially intended to be produced with live animals) under English law. It is 
notable that the appeal case of Rowe was decided by exactly the same appeal court (Paris, 4th
Chamber, section B) as decided the Huston case. Unsurprisingly, the two decisions show 
similarities in the justification of their dismissal of the moral rights infringement claims. 
Notably, two points were considered. First, the Paris Appeals Court insisted both in Rowe and in 
Huston that “the legal certainty of contracts would be destroyed if a party were allowed to ignore obligations 
                                                
76 ibid. 
77 Berne Convention, Article 5(2). 
78 Berne Convention, Article 14 bis (2). 
79 Rowe c. Société Walt Disney Productions et autres, Paris, 6 February 1986, JCP 1989, I, 3376 and [1987] F.S.R. 36. 
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entered into under the law of a specific country by availing itself of the contrasting law of another country”80. 
Secondly, both decisions refused to treat the question of moral rights of the author as a matter of 
public policy which would have imposed the application of French law.  The Court considered 
that “this concept of French public policy can be applied only with the greatest degree of precaution”81 and that it 
could not be associated with “injuries which foreign citizens, especially minors, could endure, outside the scope 
of any contract, in application of customs which our civilisation condemns as infringing the most sacred elements of 
human beings, such as physical integrity or matrimonial freedom”82. 
The Cour de Cassation in Huston however discarded this reasoning. Rather, this court, the highest 
French court, seemed to prefer the solutions adopted in the cases of Société Roy Export et Charlie 
Chaplin c. Société Les Films Roger Richebé (concerning the film The Kid)83 and Anne Bragance84. With 
the Huston decision, the Cour de Cassation defined a principle emphasising the importance of 
moral rights to the French judge. In a short decision, the French court reaffirmed the principles 
governing moral rights in its jurisdiction. It based the ruling on two essential points.  The court 
said that in France, “no prejudice can be made to the integrity of a work, regardless of the State in which it has 
first been disclosed”.  In addition “its author is entitled, by the sole fact of creation, to the moral right established 
for his benefit’85 by the French Code. Most important, these rules were said to be “laws of mandatory 
application”86. 
The solution adopted by the court was thus not even founded on the arguments put forward by 
the Huston estate. No consideration was given to the effect of the Berne Convention. The Cour 
de Cassation considered the link between the creator and his work as predominant:  no 
infringement of moral rights should be tolerated even where an assignation was governed by a 
foreign law. The importance of moral rights to the French judge was underlined by deeming 
them ‘rules of mandatory application’. By so doing the French Court put an end to any possibility of 
negating these essential rights of the author. 
                                                
80 Rowe, ibid. 
81 ibid.
82CA Paris, 6 July 1989, Société Turner Entertainment Co. c. Consorts Huston et autres, D. 1990, J. 152
83 Paris, 29 April 1959, JCP 1959, II, 11134. The facts of this case were  different but the decision admitted the right 
for a foreign citizen to benefit from the protection of moral rights in France. 
84 Paris, 1 February 1989, D. 1989. Somm. 90. It is interesting to note that both cases of The Kid and Anne Bragance
were decided by the same Chamber of the Paris Appeals Court (Paris, 1st Chamber). 
85 Cass. Civ. 1e, 28 May 1991 ; Consorts Huston et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. ; Syndicat Français des Artistes 
Interprètes et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. et autres, JCP (1991), II, 21731 : “aucune atteinte ne peut être portée à 
l’intégrité d’une œuvre littéraire ou artistique, quel que soit l’Etat sur le territoire duquel cette œuvre a été divulguée pour la première 
fois… la personne qui en est l’auteur du seul fait de sa création est investie du droit moral institué à son bénéfice”.
86 Cass. Civ. 1e, 28 May 1991 ; Consorts Huston et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. ; Syndicat Français des Artistes 
Interprètes et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. et autres, JCP (1991), II, 21731 : “ces règles sont des lois d’application 
impérative”.
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As a consequence of the decision it has been said that “the recognition of the pre-eminence of moral rights 
cannot be separated from the exclusive competence of the French provisions designating the person whom , as the 
creator of the original work , can prevail himself of these moral rights”87.   The importance of the decision 
thus becomes clear.  French law was applied in a situation where the foreign law (US Law) did 
not recognise moral rights at all. In addition, the foreign law allowed the author to assign his 
rights under contract thus relinquishing his position as the author of the work.  Admittedly, the 
UK copyright system does not find itself in an identical situation since moral rights have now 
been enacted. However, the disparities in the extent of moral rights as between the UK and 
France could raise the question of the application of French moral rights for a British author 
whose work has been posted on the Internet without consent. 
Moral Rights on the Internet 
Could the dissemination of a work on a website constitute an infringement of moral rights either 
in France or in the UK? 
Integrity and Digitisation.
Infringement of an author’s moral rights could occur by the simple fact of digitisation of his 
work. Translating a work into digital form necessarily provokes a loss in quality due to the 
compression into a format capable of being understood by a computer. The differences in loss 
of quality will  vary with the nature of the work. For instance, the digital version of a painting 
where the original is very detailed and with nuances in its colours might not be a satisfying copy 
of the original.  An author might consider such changes violate his moral right of integrity. In the 
UK, however, it is very unlikely that this digital version of the painter’s work would be 
considered as derogatory treatment by the courts since objectively it is unlikely to be seen as 
sullying his honour or reputation, amounting instead only to a slight loss in quality. The other 
view could be taken in France where the test for the violation of the integrity of the work is 
much lower and more subjective88. The artist could successfully argue that the lower quality 
affects his work to such a degree that is not acceptable to him. Going further, arguments could 
be taken from the size of the digital copy. In the UK, a court has said that the reduction of size 
                                                
87 Avocat Général Lupi, conclusions for Cass. Civ. 1e, 28 May 1991 ; Consorts Huston et autres c. Société Turner 
Entertainment Co. ; Syndicat Français des Artistes Interprètes et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. et autres, JCP (1991), 
II, 21731.
88 In this sense, see French case on acts infringing the “spirit” of the creation : The moral rights of the author were 
infringed where a certain direction of actors was considered contrary to the spirit of a theatre creation : TGI Paris, 
27 November 1985, Gaz. Pal. 1986. 2. Somm. 369.
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of a number of paintings of dinosaurs for inclusion in a catalogue was not derogatory treatment89
and so a UK author would be unlikely to have a remedy as a result of the change of size of a 
work brought about by digitisation.  In another French case, the court considered that ‘the 
suppression of the lower part of the drawing which included the name of the represented person and the author’s 
signature’90 infringed moral rights.  As a consequence, in France an author could argue that the 
reproduction on the Internet of his work in a normal size infringes his moral right of integrity 
ether because that work has to be compressed to fit the screen, or because of the impossibility to 
have the entire the creation on the screen.  The user has to scroll down to get the visual effect of 
the work. 
The right of disclosure
The second instance in which the territorial approach of copyright laws in the domain of moral 
rights can lead to considerable problems is the right of disclosure. Extensive rights are  granted 
in this category by the French Code.  The right of disclosure (or non-disclosure) does not exist as 
such in UK legislation although it is fair to say that there is no compulsion on an author to 
disseminate a work once created.  The author is perfectly at liberty to lock the work away and 
never make it available either in public or private. The French Code by contrast explicitly 
provides that “only the author has the right to disclose his creation…[and] he defines the means and conditions 
of this disclosure”91. This right of disclosure is considered as absolute and exclusive. The courts 
have clearly affirmed that the author has the right to “remain the sole judge of the opportunity of the 
publication”92 of the work and that therefore no compulsory order for the disclosure of the work 
can be obtained before the courts93.  The fact that a work might have been commissioned by a 
third party (what the US lawyers would designate as a work for hire94), makes no difference95. The 
right extends both to the timing of the disclosure and the way in which this disclosure is to take 
place. As a consequence, the author could prevent the dissemination of his work on a medium 
he considers inadequate as to the presentation and/or quality of his creation. This is of particular 
relevance in the case of dissemination in digital form over the Internet bearing in mind that such 
disclosure has to be agreed on by the author even after the transfer of the economic rights of 
exploitation to an assignee or licensee.
                                                
89 Tidy v The Trustees of the Natural History Museum (1995) 37 IPR 501.
90 CA Paris, 31 October 1988, Cahiers du Droit d’Auteur, April 1989, p. 22.
91 French Intellectual Property Code Article L. 121-2 : “L’auteur a seul le droit de divulguer son œuvre. Sous réserve des 
dispositions de l’article L. 132-24, il détermine le procédé de divulgation et les conditions de celle-ci”.
92 Lyon, 17 July 1845, DP 1845. 2. 128
93 See Cass. Civ. 14 March 1990, DP 1990. 1. 497 where the painter of a creation made “for hire” could not be 
forced to deliver the painting even though he considered it as completed. 
94 US Code Title 17, section 101 gives a definition of ‘work for hire’.
95 See, Cass. Civ. 14 March 1900, DP 1900. 1. 497, where a painter who said not to be satisfied of the result of a 
portrait ordered from him could refuse to disclose it to the public even after its display in an art gallery. 
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Following on from this, concern can be expressed as to the essential character of the right of 
disclosure under French law and relative absence from UK law. The author could argue before 
the French judge that with respect to French territory, his rights have been infringed. As the 
infringing creation is accessible in that country, he thus could claim redress.
Combining Shevill and Huston
In the light of the above, the second part of the Shevill decision will be revisited. This second 
element affirmed that ‘the criteria for assessing whether the event in question is harmful and the evidence 
required of the existence and extent of the harm alleged… are not governed by the Convention but by the 
substantive law determined by the national conflict of law rules of the court seised’96.
Indeed, the European judges determined that it should only be for the national judges to assess 
whether harm had been done by applying their own “substantive law determined by the[ir] national 
conflict of law rules”97. In consequence, it seems that the author who sees his work posted on the 
Internet could see in French courts the ideal forum for action, even though he can seek redress 
only for that part of the harm suffered in France. As we have seen above with the Huston case, 
the French Cour de Cassation considers that the French rules on moral rights are of mandatory 
application. In determining the question of rules of mandatory application, it has been said in 
relation to French procedure that:
‘when facing an international private law problem, the judge has first to consider whether his own law is of 
mandatory application and if, as a matter of fact, it necessarily requires to be directly applied to the facts of the 
case. If the answer is positive, there is no need to search further. In the opposite case, recourse has to be made to the 
conflict of laws traditional method. This latter method thus only comes to play after the possibility for the 
application of a law of mandatory application has been raised’98. 
                                                
96 Shevill and Others v. Press Alliance, case C-68/93 [1995] 2 WLR 499.
97 ibid. 
98 Loussouarn et Bourel, Precis Dalloz de Droit International Privé, 3rd edition, p. 172 : “confronté à un problème de droit 
international privé, le juge doit d’abord commencer par se demander si sa propre loi est une loi de police et si, en conséquence, elle requiert 
impérativement d’être appliquée aux faits de la cause. Si la réponse est affirmative, on ne va pas plus loin. Dans la négative, on revient à 
la méthode traditionnelle de la règle de conflit. Cette dernière joue donc en seconde ligne à partir du moment où l’hypothèse de la loi de 
police aura été levée.” ; cited by A. Françon in note under Cass. Civ. 1e, 28 May 1991 ; Consorts Huston et autres c. Société 
Turner Entertainment Co. ; Syndicat Français des Artistes Interprètes et autres c. Société Turner Entertainment Co. et autres, JCP 
(1991), II, 21731.
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As the ECJ in Shevill said that reference had to be made to the national conflict of law rules of 
the court seised, French courts will apply their own moral right laws as they are of mandatory 
application. 
The strength of the Huston decision 
Could it be argued that the Huston decision has no relevance in the UK and more generally in the 
states having ratified the Berne Convention? One might think so as by adopting the Convention, 
domestic laws would meet the minimum standards required: the floor99 of the Convention. 
French judges might therefore show more reluctance in applying their own moral rights law to 
foreign authors.  However two reasons suggest that is unlikely. 
First, there is the extremely strong nature of the wording of the decision in Huston.  The laws 
concerning the quality of author and his moral rights are clearly designated as mandatory. As the 
quote above shows, French international private law doctrine is explicit on this point.  This same 
category of rules can also be found in British international private law.  They are rules which are 
‘regarded as so important that as a matter of construction or policy they must apply in any action before a court of 
the forum even where the issues are in principle governed by a foreign law selected by a choice of law rule’100. The 
similarities with the French approach are striking. 
Certainly, UK and French law have relatively similar ideas about the quality of author, so that 
application of the British concept may not be unacceptable for the French judge. However, the 
automatic application implied by the decision in Huston necessarily imposes the French rules of 
authorship along with its moral attributes. As a consequence of the importance given to these 
rules, the UK provisions are likely to be discarded even although they recognise, in the majority 
of cases, the author of a work as the physical person behind it. 
Second, the disparities in the content of the moral rights discussed above should be considered.  
One of the essential points arising from Huston was that no moral rights were recognised in US 
law. This is not the case in the CDPA 1988.  However, the rights afforded to the authors under 
that legislation are of a much more limited scope than those in France.   The discussion above 
noted the differences that arise both between the right of integrity, and the ways in which the 
rights might differ in connection with dissemination of a work over the Internet.  In this context, 
                                                
99 Ginsburg, 1998 ibid. 
100 Law Com Working Paper No 87 (1984), Scot Law Com Consultative Memorandum No 62 para. 4.5.
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it is interesting to consider also the right of paternity. Under the CDPA 1988 the right must have 
been asserted before being invoked by the author101. Thus, unless invoked, the author, under UK 
law will have no right to be identified as such. It is quite the opposite under French law102. 
Application of the UK rules in the case of non-assertion, could thus be considered as a negation 
of the right and thus ‘repugnant to [French] public policy’103. The provisions of the French Code 
would thus find mandatory application. 
The ‘threat’ of the Huston decision to UK (and that of other countries) copyright is not in reality 
so much one of the extent of the rights granted. That is, in essence, in compliance with the 
principle of territoriality expressed in Berne Convention. Rather, it is as to the dramatic 
extension of the scope of the principle operated by the Cour de Cassation.  By designating the rules 
as ones of mandatory application there is no possibility of employment of foreign law.  As the 
Internet enables dissemination to the public on a much wider basis than other traditional means 
of disclosure, French law will always be applied in France where moral rights are at stake.
Limitations
Combining Shevill and Huston necessarily leads to a reconsideration of the notion and 
consequences of territoriality of copyright law in the Internet era especially where some courts 
may be tempted to over-protect authors. The adoption of international standards on moral rights 
could prevent those situations from arising.  However, recalling the failure to reach agreement 
on the audio-visual performers Treaty, combined with the absence of moral rights provisions in 
the Infosoc Directive and the reluctance on the part of some countries who are signatories to the 
Berne Convention even to include the minimum obligations on moral rights104 would seem to 
make  the prospect of such legislation a pure utopia. As a result reliance may  have to be placed 
on national courts to adopt a reasonable position if and when questions of infringement of moral 
rights come before them. 
Looking to the French courts, there are two arguments to suggest that this might just happen.  
The first concerns the moral right of disclosure. Despite the stringent application of this right by 
French courts, the wording in the French Code leads certain authors to consider that its scope 
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and influence are not of such major importance. The exact text imposing the right of disclosure 
in the Code uses a word in the singular form in order to determinate how the disclosure is to 
take place. Indeed, in the French text uses ‘the means… of disclosure’ in the singular form105.  This 
has lead certain writers to argue that once the author has disclosed his creation by any means, he 
cannot use his moral rights against third parties by saying that he did not agree to disclosure of 
his work on another medium. ‘This thus evidences that there can only be one disclosure of the work. After 
this, only are concerned the means of exploitation of the work which are part of the patrimonial rights’106.  This 
interpretation tends to avoid the over influence of the moral rights, and especially that of 
disclosure.  However this exegetic analysis of the French provision is not totally satisfactory as it 
avoids the fact that the author is also granted by the same text the right to determine ‘the conditions 
of disclosure’.  These conditions could cover posting of the work on an Internet site. 
The second argument concerns the right of integrity.  The scope and influence of this right of 
could be limited by the fact that courts will not easily accept abusive recourse to the right where 
it appears that the authors (as they tend to do it more and more) are trying to engage in 
‘patrimonialisation’ of their moral rights.  In other words, authors may threaten to exert moral 
rights unless the exploiter will increase the price paid for the economic rights.  This is especially 
true in situations where an assignation has been concluded by the author with another party. The 
terms of the CDPA 1988 do not expressly provide for the requirement of the specific mention 
of each means and conditions in which the rights are assigned. By contrast, the French Code  is 
very strict in this respect and requires a specific term for  transfer of the different types of rights: 
‘each of the assigned rights [must] be individually specified in the assignment contract and that the domain of 
exploitation of the assigned rights be limited as to its scope and its destination, its territorial scope and length’107. 
Reference is thus once more made to the ‘droit de destination’  with the consequence that, to post a 
work on the Internet, the assignee will have to specify it in the contract. Nevertheless, any 
attempt to use moral rights as a lever to obtain monetary reward for granting consent to 
economic exploitation is likely to bring the author up against the view taken by the majority of 
the French doctrine :  ‘it is right to think that the author who grants an authorisation on the basis of his 
patrimonial rights for a given use necessarily accepts the consequences linked with this use and cannot invoke his 
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moral rights – and especially the right of integrity – to hinder a use he has authorised. These rights cannot enable 
him to ‘take back with one hand’ what he has given with the other’108. 
Conclusion
It has been argued above that French moral right laws could be applied to authors whose works 
are disseminated over the Internet.  In many cases, the action would be limited to the harm 
arising within French territory.  Nonetheless, the differences between UK and French moral 
right laws suggest that an author might just engage in a forum shopping exercise to vindicate a 
perceived violation of those rights where no remedy would otherwise be available.  French 
courts may not always be willing to offer the author the redress he seeks, particularly if an 
underlying motive might be to exert more money from the exploiter.  But nonetheless, this must 
leave exploiters feeling vulnerable to the whims of aggrieved authors and artists particularly in an 
era when convergence of media is becoming a reality.  
Apart from relying on the French courts to take a reasonable approach is there anything else that 
might make exploiters feel less vulnerable?  Certainly the enormous practical difficulties 
combined with the expense of taking an action in France (where the author was not already 
based there) must deter all but the most resolute109.  Although that of course would not prevent a 
pressure group from combining resources to bring a case, if only to make a point.  Enforcement 
is another tricky question.  As has been indicated, the Brussels Regulation in force in March 2002 
will streamline still further enforcement issues, but that does raise problems of further expense 
for the author.  One of the most potent remedies for an author holding a judgement from a 
French court determining that his moral rights had been violated, might be to require that the 
offending work was inaccessible within French Territory.  This would be similar to the order 
handed down by the French court in the case of LICRA v Yahoo! Inc110, a criminal case where a 
French court ordered Yahoo!, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) based in the US to make 
information and artefacts concerning Nazi memorabilia inaccessible to French citizens on 
French soil where such activity was unlawful.  The effect was to impose French criminal law 
standards in this area on an Internet Service Provider based in the US where such activity was 
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not unlawful.  Despite arguing that compliance with such an order was impossible, and seeking a 
declaration to that effect from the US court in San Jose, Yahoo! nonetheless modified its own 
behaviour by declaring that as from January 2001, all such artefacts and information would be 
banned from its servers.  It might be thought that a judgement from a French court banning the 
availability of sites within France if the content violated moral rights might have the same effect. 
However, such an outcome might be affected by the US decision given in favour of Yahoo! Inc. 
in response to their request for a declaratory judgement in a US court that the French order was 
unenforceable against them in the US. On 7 November 2001111 the Federal Court in San Jose 
accepted Yahoo’s arguments that an American company hosting its site on the US territory could 
not be compelled to satisfy  the laws of 200 different countries:  such an outcome would ‘chill[s] 
Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights’.  Therefore, in the domain of Internet content, the solution 
adopted by the US court was that of the application of the national law of the site. The material 
which was objectionable in France would be judged by US standards, where it was not unlawful.  
The liability of the Internet Service Provider which made that content available would similarly 
be judged by the laws of the home country.
Does this solution reduce the scope of the Shevill and Huston decisions combined?   Such a 
conclusion is far from certain.   Indeed, nothing indicates that the French judge who decided that 
Yahoo! had to take the relevant technical measures in order to prevent access to the Nazi items 
available on their site, with the threat of fines is the order was not complied with would not, if 
another action is brought to him, consider Yahoo! liable and sanction the company once again. 
The US court was careful to consider notions of comity in its decision, but felt those issues were 
outweighed by the need to uphold the First Amendment.  A French court might, as suggested, 
feel similarly constrained in weighing up any further violation by Yahoo! (or any other ISP) and 
consider that the principle of comity was outweighed by the obligation to uphold French 
criminal law.  A conflict between two jurisdictions would then arise with no indications as to 
which should prevail.  The likelihood of such a conflict in the area of moral rights could be 
considered as even stronger in the light of the above discussion on the Huston case. 
What therefore might be other avenues of development?  One of the difficulties faced by Yahoo! 
exemplified by the above case was that they were unable to limit the availability of the site within 
France, while at the same time having it available to surfers elsewhere in the world.  In other 
words the information could not be geographically limited.  As has been pointed out, this is one 
of the fundamental features of the Internet:  it does not respect national borders.  Information 
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can, and does, flow seamlessly from one part of the globe to another.  But there are certain 
worrying signs that in the not too distant future, this borderless nature of the Internet may be a 
thing of the past.  Copyright owners are frantically building anti-copying mechanisms both into 
the hardware, software and works which are disseminated around the Internet112.  The purpose 
behind these devices has always been said to be so that owners may control the copying of the 
works, and once copying can be controlled, so an economic return can be extracted for 
subsequent use.  But what is to prevent these devices from containing mechanisms whereby 
dissemination will also be limited geographically?  When combined with anti-copying devices 
within the hardware, there seems little to prevent geographic limiters being included.  Faced with 
the threat of moral rights actions in France might just spur copyright owners to pour further 
resources into building such fences113.  Such an outcome would be catastrophic for the 
philosophy that has always underlain the Internet:  that of seamless communication and 
dissemination. 
One of the positive outcomes of the threat hanging over the exploiters might of course to give 
greater respect to the authors and performers with whom they work.  If the threat to exert moral 
rights is only done for the purpose of exerting greater financial return, then, as has been argued, 
the authors are likely to be given short shrift.  However, if it is actually done to see the 
performance of a work realised such that it will meet the vision of the author, then exploiters 
may have to change their working habits to accommodate these concerns.  An alternative or 
additional avenue for authors seeking to secure the integrity of their work might be to reach out 
to the end users of their work directly, by-passing the intermediary.  This, of course, is not an 
option in all cases, but the Internet makes it much easier for an artist or author to contract 
directly with those individuals interested in their work, without the need for a third party in the 
distribution chain.  An initiative being spearheaded by Lawrence Lessig of Stanford University 
appears designed to do just this.  Plans have been announced to develop a ‘creative commons’, 
an initiative that is designed to make available flexible, customisable intellectual-property licenses 
that artists, writers, programmers and others can obtain free of charge to legally define what 
constitutes acceptable uses of their work.  Terms might include a prohibition on alteration of the 
work, and that it may not be used without proper attribution114.  In other words, defining moral 
rights by contract.
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Perhaps these tensions, between States, between copyright owners and users, between authors 
and exploiters are necessary to push States towards constructive debate for the development of a 
coherent international copyright system which takes cognisance of the interests of all concerned, 
authors, exploiters and users, and which meets both public and private interests in so doing.   
Instead, and at present, it seems that uniformity of copyright laws tends to be achieved by means 
of the application of national standards to Internet Service Providers, by private interests 
building fences to protect content, and by self-interested lobbying groups blocking measures that 
might inhibit economic exploitation of works.  The risk of such an hiatus is that of the adoption 
of a series of diverse and conflicting texts and measures finally hindering the application of each 
other resulting in chaos for all, and certainty for none.  
